



The housing policies for Ethiopian immigrants in Israel: Spatial segregation, economic feasibility and political acceptability

Fred A. Lazin

To cite this article: Fred A. Lazin (1997) The housing policies for Ethiopian immigrants in Israel: Spatial segregation, economic feasibility and political acceptability, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 3:4, 39-68, DOI: [10.1080/13537119708428517](https://doi.org/10.1080/13537119708428517)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537119708428517>



Published online: 24 Dec 2007.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 131



View related articles [↗](#)



Citing articles: 10 View citing articles [↗](#)

The Housing Policies for Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: Spatial Segregation, Economic Feasibility and Political Acceptability

FRED A. LAZIN

This paper studies the housing absorption policies of the Israeli government for almost 50,000 Black Ethiopian Jews who immigrated since the early 1980s. The objective is to explain why particular policies were adopted and why the Ethiopians were treated so differently. Why did so many Ethiopians find themselves in spatially segregated housing in the periphery despite official policies to the contrary?

One explanation is provided by Holt (1995) who argues that the spatial segregation of housing for Ethiopians was inevitable; policies mattered little. It is argued here that policies did matter – it was government policy that directed Ethiopians to specific communities and locations – but the key to understanding why the particular policies were adopted lies with the concepts of political acceptability and feasibility (economic and political).

In response to a question about policies to absorb the recent influx of Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants (1989–92), a former Israeli Prime Minister responded: 'There was no policy. ... Immigration itself creates solutions ... and solves problems' To the same question, a senior Jewish Agency absorption official commented: 'At the university you have ideas of vast plans ... in life we do not have the time needed to make one. ... There is a need for quick and immediate decisions.'

Introduction

Israeli governments since independence have pursued the goal of providing every Jewish immigrant a 'decent home in a suitable living environment'.¹ The government contracted for or built two-thirds of all new housing units until 1967; thereafter, it supplied about one-third and offered immigrants subsidized mortgages to purchase housing in the private market. By the

Fred A. Lazin, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel

Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol.3, No.4, Winter 1997, pp.39–68
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

mid-1980s, subsidized mortgages and rents became the major form of assistance for permanent housing for new immigrants. In the 1990s, Israel spent 4 per cent of its growth domestic product (GDP) on housing subsidies, 'a truly immense proportion of its limited economic resources'.²

In the late 1980s, the government privatized the immigrant absorption process. As an alternative to absorption centres, it provided newly arrived immigrants with an allowance to rent apartments of their choice in the private market. Most of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union during 1989–92 participated in 'direct absorption'. Later, many used government subsidized mortgages to purchase housing, mostly in central Israel.

In contrast, the government denied Ethiopian Jewish immigrants participation in direct absorption. They became wards of the state, being placed in absorption centres and other temporary facilities.³ Later, most would be directed to permanent housing in spatially segregated clusters in specific neighbourhoods and municipalities, often in Israel's periphery. Their absorption experience with temporary and permanent housing was very similar to that of earlier Jewish immigrants from Arab and Islamic countries in the 1950s and 1960s, who were also housed in peripheral areas where there were fewer economic opportunities and second-rate educational, social, and health facilities. In Weingrod's view however, 'the Ethiopians' saga is qualitatively different in the far greater lack of autonomy that many have been able to attain'.⁴

This paper studies the housing absorption policies of the Israeli government for the almost 50,000 Black Ethiopian Jews who have immigrated since the early 1980s.⁵ Special attention is given to the 14,000 Ethiopian Jews of Operation Solomon who arrived during a 36-hour period in May 1991. The paper covers the initial efforts to provide temporary shelter in absorption centres, hotels, and caravan (mobile home) sites and limited use of modified direct absorption. It also analyzes permanent housing policies, including rental housing (public housing), mortgages, and provision of dispersed units in 'stronger communities' in central Israel.

This paper documents the temporary and permanent housing policies. More importantly, it explains why particular policies were adopted and why the Ethiopians were treated so differently. Why were policies which had been considered 'mistakes' in the 1950s continued in the 1990s? Why did so many Ethiopians find themselves in spatially segregated housing in the periphery and in low income neighbourhoods in central Israel despite official policies to the contrary?

One explanation is provided by Holt, who argues that the spatial segregation of housing for Ethiopians was inevitable regardless of the intent of policies. He emphasizes the low socio-economic and educational status

of the Ethiopian immigrant community in contrast to the host society.⁶ He receives support from Kaplan and Rosen, who claim that Ethiopians preferred to live near families and friends already residing in the periphery.⁷ It will be argued here that policies did matter – it was government policy that directed Ethiopians to specific communities and locations – but the key to understanding why the particular policies were adopted lies with the concepts of political acceptability and feasibility (economic and political).⁸ These included:

1. Dispersal policies had lacked sufficient political support while generating significant opposition;
2. race was a factor, especially in creating opposition to having Ethiopians as neighbours;
3. it was far cheaper, quicker, and easier to house Ethiopians in peripheral areas where there was vacant public housing and where the government was building housing for Soviet immigrants; and,
4. vested interests of the Jewish Agency significantly limited the temporary housing options given to Ethiopian immigrants.

While the findings here are about Israel, they provide interesting and important insights about the implementation of low-income housing policies for minority immigrants. While the Israeli government favored dispersal policies, it actually implemented policies that concentrated the Ethiopian immigrants in weaker communities and neighbourhoods. Why this was the case should be of interest to scholars of absorption and housing policies in many countries.

Methodological Issues

This research 'deals ... with behavior of senior political decision makers and policymaking organizations', and is based on a partial review of relevant archival materials in the Ministries of Absorption, Finance, and Housing and the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI or the Agency).⁹ The materials include minutes and memos of important governmental and JAFI committees, as well as some of the correspondence of major absorption, housing, and JAFI officials. In addition, the author conducted in-depth, structured, and open-ended interviews with many of the senior administrative and elected officials. The author also reviewed results of the research of others and newspapers.

This is an implementation study: rather than evaluate the success of policies, it investigates their implementation and explains their outcomes.¹⁰ The objective is to provide 'a clear factual account of the implementation experience [while recognizing] different points of view [held] by the

various participants in the implementation experience.¹¹

The author discounts the analytical distinction made by Pressman and Wildavsky between policy formulation and implementation; rather, policymaking and implementation are viewed as part of a single interactive and interdependent process.¹² Events preceding, as well as during, a formal policymaking stage influence the policy implementation process. Moreover, parts of a policy may be incomplete, unclear, and ambiguous. Public policy 'lays down general directives, rather than detailed instructions'.¹³ In addition, its intent could be 'adaptive' rather than 'programmed', with the objective being to establish agreements on 'acceptable rules of the game that would allow the multiple participants to bargain and compromise during the course of implementation'.¹⁴ Most importantly, enacted policies are probably continuously re-negotiated before (and after) implementation at the national and local levels. Therefore, policy analysis must pay attention to how political, bureaucratic, economic, and cultural variables influence policy implementation.

An understanding of the political-bureaucratic context of Israeli politics is essential for comprehending housing policies for Ethiopian immigrants. First, the Israeli government is not a uniform body, but is 'composed of largely independent ministries'.¹⁵ In the case of housing absorption policies, ministries often 'operate more as competing units than as integral parts of a co-ordinated government machinery'.¹⁶

A second issue concerns the extent to which public policymaking is dominated by elected officials versus bureaucrats or senior civil servants; that is, to what extent do political parties control the policies of their respective ministries.¹⁷

In their classic study of policymaking in Israel, Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror viewed party politicians as the key and dominant actors with bureaucrats playing a secondary role.¹⁸ In his later works, Dror describes a shift toward increased bureaucratic influence.¹⁹ Ira Sharkansky describes contemporary Israel as a bureaucratic state with professional administrators formulating and implementing government policy.²⁰ The present study confirms this shift: while politicians made some important macro policy decisions, most policies described here were put together and implemented by professional administrators. It is the professional administrators who fill in the details of very 'general [policy] directives ... on the main lines of action to be followed ... [providing] detailed subpolicies that translate the general policy into more concrete terms ... needed to execute it'.²¹

During the period under study here, the Ministry of Absorption was responsible for the permanent absorption of immigrants. The Ministry of Housing, however, provided the budget for housing new immigrants, while the budget division of the Finance Ministry supervised line items for

immigrants in the budgets of all ministries. In addition, the Jewish Agency's Immigration and Absorption Department, controlled by an Israeli political party, brought new immigrants to Israel and cared for them during their first year in the country.²²

Between 1988 and 1990, during the second government of national unity, the Likud Party controlled the Housing Ministry and the Labor Party the Ministries of Finance and Absorption and the Jewish Agency's Absorption Department. In June 1989, Finance Minister Shimon Peres (Labor) established a subcommittee of ministry director generals (Beilin Committee) to prepare a comprehensive absorption plan for the expected arrival of many Soviet Jews. Thereafter, the Beilin Committee tried to co-ordinate government and JAFI immigrant absorption policies.²³ In June 1990, Ariel Sharon, the housing minister in the new Likud government (1990–92), headed an Immigration Cabinet charged with co-ordinating government and Agency absorption policies. A member of the minority faction of the Likud became finance minister and the head of a single-member Knesset party became absorption minister. The Labor Party continued to control the Agency's Absorption Department.

The broader macro-economic context also affected the policy implementation process.²⁴ During 1989–92, the national security situation of Israel, including the Palestinian uprising (*Intifada*), as well as the government's settlement policy in the occupied territories and the massive immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union (see Appendix), has influenced policy and resources for the absorption and housing of Ethiopian Jewry.

Finally, race and culture shaped several aspects of policy implementation. First, the Ethiopians were Black Africans, unlike almost all other Israeli Jews. This influenced the reluctance of some mayors and tenants to accept them as residents and neighbours, respectively, and explains why their presence in an area caused apartment values to drop. Second, cultural factors also affected the response of the host society toward the Ethiopians as potential neighbours. The 'norms of conduct, social practices, and the political and economic structures of modern industrial society were foreign' to many Ethiopians. In addition, many lacked formal education and most did not know how to read and write.²⁵ Third, the Jewish religion of the Ethiopians differed from the Orthodox Judaism of Israel. This raised the issue of their being accepted as Jews for marriage and education. Finally, strong extended-family ties among Ethiopian Jews influenced their preferences as to where to live in Israel.

Israel and Immigration

Following independence in 1948, Israel's Knesset (parliament) enacted the Law of Return (1950), which granted Jews throughout the world the right to immigrate and become Israeli citizens.²⁶ Massive immigration propelled national and economic development as new immigrants doubled Israel's population by 1952 and tripled it by 1960 (see Appendix).

Initially most immigrants lived in temporary camps operated by the JAFI in central (coastal) Israel. Many lived in tents with the more fortunate staying in abandoned army camps. Everywhere, electricity, running water, and sanitary conditions were minimal. Equally scarce were educational and social services. Within a few years between 110,000 and 160,000 moved into abandoned Arab housing.²⁷ The majority, however, moved to transit camps (*ma'abarot*), established by the Jewish Agency as a temporary solution. Here families rented a hut and provided for their own livelihood. By the end of 1951 there were 92 *ma'abarot* with 52,000 dwelling units.

In the early 1950s, arguing that national security prohibited concentrating the Jewish population along the coastal strip, the government adopted a policy of population dispersal and settled new immigrants in development or 'new' towns in sparsely populated peripheral areas, some of which were in regions with Israeli Arabs and near hostile borders.²⁸ The government gave new immigrants priority in housing. Most of those arriving in the 1950s were sent directly from boats or planes to new housing, furnished by the JAFI, in development towns and rural co-operatives (*moshavim*). In contrast, many 'veteran' immigrants in the *ma'abarot* remained in place. Immigrants of means settled themselves in the major cities.²⁹

Critics claimed that the population dispersal policy was part of an overall effort by the existing political establishment to create a dependent immigrant population that allowed the retention of power during national growth and development.³⁰ Regardless of intent, the population dispersal policy limited opportunities for new immigrants: During its early decades, Israel's economic development and growth occurred in the centre of the country, by-passing the development towns.³¹ Moreover, the level of educational, social, and health services in the new towns lagged far behind that of central Israel; for example, '[m]ost of the new communities lacked facilities for secondary education.'³² Despite the relatively small size of the country, residents of the development towns did not have access to jobs in the centre. According to Halper and Smooha, dispersal policies contributed to a social gap between veteran Israelis of European origin [Ashkenazim] and their offspring and the newer Jewish immigrants from Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East (Sephardim or Orientals).³³ The latter

constituted the overwhelming majority of the new towns' population.

These absorption policies also fostered paternalism, characterized by bureaucratic control of a dependent immigrant population who became wards of the state.³⁴ Immigrants had little to say about where they would live, their children's education, and their means of livelihood. Weingrod described entire immigrant villages (and towns) as 'administered communities' where 'social, cultural, economic, and political development was directly determined by outside agencies.'³⁵

In contrast, the Jewish Agency Absorption Department gave preferential treatment to many Polish Jewish immigrants in the first decade of the state. At great expense, it provided some of them with subsidized housing in the centre of the country.³⁶

The failure to attract young Western volunteers as immigrants following the Six Day War in 1967 resulted in a broad attack against Agency absorption authorities and their policies. This led to the establishment of a state Ministry of Absorption in 1968. Nevertheless, the Agency retained its central role in absorption because of the United States tax code, which prohibited UJA funds being given directly to a foreign government.³⁷ Lacking sufficient resources, the new ministry unsuccessfully co-ordinated absorption policies of the various ministries and the semi-autonomous Jewish Agency.

While continuing with many of the same paternalistic policies toward poor immigrants from 'countries of distress', the ministry and the Jewish Agency initiated new programmes for 'academic' immigrants from (Western) 'countries of affluence'.³⁸ It assigned the latter to absorption centres in central Israel for six months, where they received meals, Hebrew lessons, a general orientation, and help finding a job and an apartment.³⁹ In response to increased immigration from the Soviet Union (1968–73) the JAFI rented 6,000 private apartments in central Israel which it then offered to the immigrants at subsidized rents.⁴⁰

The expected massive wave of immigration from the Soviet Union in 1988 led the government to institute a policy of 'direct absorption' which by-passes absorption centres. Following a short stay at a hotel or with relatives, the immigrant receives a financial stipend and rents housing on the private market. The immigrant then finds a job or participates in a subsidized job training programme. The government and JAFI excluded Ethiopians from direct absorption.⁴¹ They, along with a minority of Soviet immigrants (mostly elderly, handicapped, and single-parent families), continued to be absorbed in Jewish Agency absorption centres.

Officially, Agency and government officials argued that the Ethiopians were incapable of being absorbed directly into Israeli society; they lacked the education, skills, knowledge, resources, and appropriate culture to find

housing on their own.⁴² Not mentioned were apparent vested interests of the Agency and government in keeping the Ethiopians under its care and control. First, if the Ethiopians participated in 'direct absorption', the JAFI risked losing control over tens of millions of dollars annually. It received and/or administered these funds for absorbing Ethiopians from the Israeli and American governments and from overseas Jewish philanthropic groups. Moreover, caring for Ethiopians in exclusive Agency institutions helped overseas agencies raise money for the Jewish Agency: 'They could be displayed as a unique and exotic group; black, Jewish and poor.'⁴³

Second, while 'direct absorption' had reduced the Agency's role in absorption, the care for Ethiopians delayed the Agency's transfer of its absorption responsibilities and facilities. The Agency needed the Ethiopians as dependent immigrants for its own survival. In the late 1980s the Agency agreed to transfer its absorption functions and facilities (absorption centres) to the government. While overseas donors favored this move, Israeli Agency officials and bureaucrats opposed it. An agreement was signed in November 1988, but only partially implemented; the arrival of the large wave of Russian and Ethiopian immigrants was to delay the transfer of absorption centres and other functions for several more years.⁴⁴

The Israeli government also had a financial incentive to deny Ethiopian Jews access to 'direct absorption'. The Agency with overseas moneys funded 100 per cent of absorption via absorption centres. In contrast, direct absorption initially required the government of Israel to fund 50 per cent of the absorption basket. Later it would be much more.

Ethiopians Come to Israel

Tad Szulc claims that Israeli authorities 'believed [from the beginning] ... that the Black Jews should ... come to the promised land'.⁴⁵ In contrast, Graenum Berger, founder of the American Association for Ethiopian Jewry (AAEJ), argues that most Israeli leaders opposed the immigration of Ethiopian Jews. Their immigration occurred, he believes, despite the reluctance of Israeli and Jewish Agency officials.⁴⁶ According to Kaplan and Rosen, prior to 1977, only one hundred Ethiopian Jews 'had been grudgingly allowed [to immigrate] ... by either Ethiopian or Israeli authorities.'⁴⁷ Thereafter, the Israeli government began to foster their immigration.

Many in Israel had questioned their being Jewish. A major change occurred in 1973, when the then Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef recognized them as descendants of the Tribe of Dan and eligible to emigrate under the Law of Return.⁴⁸ For the purpose of marriage, however, he insisted that they undergo 'strict conversion procedures' involving immersions for

men and women, symbolic recircumcision for the men and a commitment to obey Jewish Law. In 1976, using Rabbi Yosef's letter, Minister of Interior Shlomo Hillel officially accepted them as Jews under the Law of Return.⁴⁹ Israeli authorities brought two groups of Ethiopian youth (27 in all) to study at a (JAFI) boarding school in 1955. Some returned to Ethiopia and became Hebrew teachers, while others remained in Israel. Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 and up to 1984 almost 6,500 Ethiopian Jews emigrated to Israel (see Appendix). Many left secretly with the aid of the Israeli intelligence services (Mossad) or the AAEJ.⁵⁰

Increased persecution led several thousand Ethiopian Jews to flee into Sudan in 1984. Between 21 November 1984 and 5 June 1985 the Israeli Mossad and the American-based Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) conducted Operation Moses, a covert airlift that brought almost 8,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel.⁵¹ In response to disclosure by Israel, Sudan stopped the operation. Shortly thereafter, the United States government evacuated the remaining 600 Jews then in Sudan and brought them to Israel.

In early June 1987, then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir called for the reunification of Ethiopian Jews with their families in Israel. He stated: 'We are ready to get them out by every means – formal, informal, clandestine, or whatever.'⁵² With resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and Ethiopia, immigration rose to 1,382 in 1989 and 4,153 in 1990.⁵³

Concerned about the well being of Jews left in Ethiopia, and having reservations about the commitment of the Israeli government and JAFI to rescue them, the AAEJ encouraged Ethiopian Jews to leave their homes in the provinces and move to Addis Ababa. AAEJ hoped by these means to pressure the Israeli government to airlift them out.⁵⁴

By September of 1990, almost 21,000 Ethiopian Jews waited in various shantytowns and camps in Addis.⁵⁵ In fall 1990, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir appointed Uri Lubrani to negotiate with the Ethiopian government for their emigration.⁵⁶ In May 1991, Uri Lubrani agreed to pay a \$35 million ransom and the Ethiopian government allowed the airlift. United States government intervention with Ethiopian rebels stalled their entry into the city until after the airlift.

During a 36-hour period between May 24 and 26, 1991, the Israeli Air Force airlifted 14,160 persons from Ethiopia to Israel in Operation Solomon.

Housing Absorption Policies (1984 to Operation Solomon)

The increase in Ethiopian immigration in October 1984 led to a resumption of the government/JAFI Co-ordinating Committee (Board) and Authority for Immigration and Absorption (CC) which had been established in 1954.

The committee established an Ethiopian subcommittee, chaired by the minister of absorption, to co-ordinate all absorption efforts. The JAFI retained its exclusive responsibility for Ethiopian immigrants upon their arrival and during their first year in Israel.⁵⁷ Officially, all would be handled in Agency absorption centres.

In early 1984, the Co-ordinating Committee gave permanent housing the highest priority. A consensus existed at the time that, due to unfamiliarity with modern society and life, Ethiopians would be unable on their own to either rent or purchase housing; it would have to be provided; and the Absorption Ministry would co-ordinate housing with resources provided by the government and JAFI.⁵⁸

Two major principles governed housing policies for Ethiopians. First, the government would purchase apartments in areas '*that have strong infrastructures*' more in the centre than the periphery (emphasis added). Second, Ethiopian immigrants would be integrated within Israeli society in groups whose size enabled observance of community life *while not creating "congregational pockets"* (emphasis added).⁵⁹ During the next few years, however, actual policies and practices often contradicted these principles.

First, many Ethiopian immigrants became semi-permanent residents of the absorption centres. While other immigrants were expected to remain in the centres for up to six months, the official expectation for Ethiopians was one year. Many stayed longer.⁶⁰ In February 1984, for example, over one half of the 3,000 Ethiopians in JAFI absorption centres had been there more than one year and some for more than three years. During Operation Moses, with absorption centres filled to capacity, the JAFI placed thousands of Ethiopians in hotels, where many remained for over a year.⁶¹ Little changed by 1989 when the JAFI operated 42 absorption centres, eleven of which were exclusively for Ethiopians. Sixty-five per cent of the 2,667 Ethiopian residents had been living in the centres for at least four years!⁶²

Once in absorption centres, many Ethiopians preferred to remain rather than move to permanent housing which was often located in other towns and cities. This was for a variety of reasons, including financial, having children in nearby schools, proximity to work, and presence of friends and relatives in the centre and nearby area.⁶³ Some found the absorption centres and caravans adequate; they had a roof over their heads and a caretaker to deal with their problems. Why leave to fend for themselves in an uncertain and sometimes hostile environment? In addition, JAFI absorption centre personnel preferred for them to stay out of concern for their own jobs: empty absorption centres might be closed.

The increase in Soviet immigration in 1989–90, with thousands of poor, elderly, and handicapped people, aggravated competition for the few vacant places in absorption centres.⁶⁴ Most were full and few people were leaving;

consequently, some newer Ethiopian immigrants went to live with relatives. While the host family received monthly compensation, the immigrants received no services.⁶⁵ Officially, this was not a policy.

A second trend in housing found an increasing number of Ethiopian immigrants renting public housing units in low-income neighbourhoods in peripheral development towns and lower-income neighbourhoods in central Israel. This contradicted the guiding policy principles of scattered permanent housing in areas with strong socio-economic infrastructure.

While the JAFI initially opposed the use of empty public housing units, it later supported the decision of Amigour to provide 200 'good' apartments (deemed habitable) in 'reasonable areas' to settle Ethiopians from caravans and absorption centres.⁶⁶ By late 1988, over 2,000 Ethiopians resided in Amigour's apartments and many more in Amidar units. The units had been rehabilitated at the expense of government and JAFI absorption budgets.⁶⁷ Many were concentrated in particular buildings and neighbourhoods in low-income areas. The government encouraged Ethiopian immigrants in rental public housing to purchase these units.⁶⁸

Another public housing option involved the Housing Ministry's purchase of older apartments in the private sector, which the Absorption Ministry rented to immigrants via Amidar and Amigour.⁶⁹ Most units were scattered in low-income neighbourhoods in poorer municipalities in central Israel (see Appendix). Officially, the Absorption Ministry limited Ethiopian families to no more than three in any one entrance.⁷⁰

Third, government policy turned many temporary (convertible) absorption centres into permanent public housing for Ethiopians. This created instant mini-ghettos of Black Ethiopians in low-income neighbourhoods in peripheral development towns and in poorer neighbourhoods in central Israel. In late 1986, there were at least 14 convertible absorption centres with 700 Ethiopian families (3,500 persons).⁷¹ The Agency had converted these centres into permanent housing in order to shut down the provision of support services. Since they had become permanent units, the Ministry of Absorption also did not have to provide absorption services, regardless of need. Thus, needy residents became the responsibility of municipal social welfare authorities.

Fourth, the initial mortgage policy produced poor results. A relatively small number of mortgages were given to Ethiopian families until 1991; for example, 470 were issued between 1988 and 1990, 725 in 1991, 1,073 in 1992, 1,471 in 1993, 1,691 in 1994, 998 in 1995, and 285 in 1996.⁷² Most absorption officials expected that immigrants would need time to decide on where to live permanently, especially if they were unemployed. All the more so for the Ethiopians, many of whom were unfamiliar with the mortgage system and often viewed 'home purchase with suspicion'.⁷³ In

addition, the level of mortgages may have been insufficient to purchase housing in 'good' locations.⁷⁴

Until Operation Solomon in May 1991, the government had provided about 5,000 permanent housing solutions for 16,000 Ethiopians. This left 9,000 Ethiopians still lacking permanent housing.⁷⁵

The Provision of Housing for Jews from Operation Solomon

The Co-ordinating Committee assigned the Jewish Agency responsibility for the expected arrivals of Operation Solomon during their first year in Israel. They arrived when the country was also being inundated by an unprecedented wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Additional Ethiopians would continue to arrive during the coming years.⁷⁶

During late spring 1991, the Agency's absorption department consulted with the military and several ministries about its temporary housing plans for Operation Solomon.⁷⁷ Tents were considered 'politically' unacceptable, since Soviet immigrants had been placed in apartments. Thus, the Agency had Amidar lease 14,500 rooms in 35 hotels and prepare 2,500 places in six caravan sites. The latter contained 45-square-metre mobile homes.⁷⁸

Each hotel and caravan site became an Agency absorption centre which was adopted by an existing centre whose staff provided services until permanent personnel were hired.⁷⁹ Each facility was to have Hebrew classes, kindergarten, social and cultural activities, and social welfare services.

The Agency placed about 11,000 persons in hotels in the periphery and in Jerusalem. There were several initial problems: First, only sleeping facilities (rooms) had been rented: there were no arrangements for cooking in rooms, which made hotels a more expensive option.⁸⁰ Second, some hotels did not sign a letter of agreement, which resulted in evacuation by 25 June. Third, some hotel management harassed Ethiopian immigrants.

The Agency housed another 3,460 Ethiopian immigrants in mobile homes in caravan sites operated by Amidar that were located mostly in Galilee (northern Israel) and Negev (southern Israel).⁸¹ Most sites were in rural areas and lacked completed infrastructures and access to urban areas, jobs, transportation and Israelis (i.e., normal interaction with Israeli society).

Another means of housing Ethiopian immigrants from Operation Solomon was to have them taken in by relatives and friends. Officials gave this policy little publicity and recognition and claimed that few participated. Nevertheless, the housing ministry provided host families with grants for up to five years.⁸²

Removal of Ethiopians from Hotels to Caravans

The official government short-term housing goal in early fall 1991 was to transfer the 11,000–12,000 Ethiopian immigrants from hotels to caravan sites and absorption centres as quickly as possible. Caravans thus became the extended temporary residences of most Ethiopians from Operation Solomon. Originally planned for the large influx of Soviet immigrants, the caravan sites housed many Soviet immigrants as well as some poor and 'homeless' Israelis.⁸³ Minister of Housing Ariel Sharon expected to have the caravans and *Meguranim* (split residency caravans) in place and occupied by December 1990 and May 1991, respectively. In September 1991, 3,400 of the 5651 caravans and 1,194 of 9,084 *Meguranim* in place were occupied.⁸⁴

Cost was also a problem. Rural locations required investments in infrastructures. From an initial estimate of \$15,000 (30,000 NIS) per unit they ended up costing as much as \$39,000 (92,000 NIS) per unit.⁸⁵ It would have been considerably cheaper to build permanent housing of larger size units.

While the sites were located throughout the country most were in rural areas. Mayors of most larger cities refused to accept caravans. Those few that did often placed them in industrial areas with high pollution and even in city dumps. Opposition by local authorities in Ashkelon left caravans vacant. Later problems with local permits to develop the infrastructure led to delays and problems with water and electricity hook-ups.⁸⁶

Assuming that occupants would be Russian immigrants, municipal authorities feared recreating transit camps (*ma'abarot*) of the 1950s. Less publicized was the concern of many mayors, especially in development towns, that the Russians might upset the local political balance in which the clear majority of voters were Sephardi Jews. To a lesser extent some mayors were anxious about the potential negative reaction of their voters if they helped the 'Ashkenazi' immigrants.

A removal team headed by the Housing Ministry and involving the Agency and the Absorption Ministry began to work in October 1991. It expected to complete the relocation of Ethiopians from Operation Solomon by February 1992. It failed to do so.⁸⁷

In December 1991, there were only eight caravan sites with 3,900 Ethiopian immigrants and another 14 sites being prepared. Amidar pressured the JAFI to use the sites before support facilities (electricity) were finished, which resulted in JAFI investing its own funds to speed up development. Later, the JAFI lacked sufficient funds to purchase furniture, stoves, and refrigerators, which further delayed occupancy.⁸⁸

As the June 1992 Knesset elections approached, over 6,173 persons

from Operation Solomon remained in hotels, and another 10,135 were in caravans. Six additional caravan sites for 5,025 Ethiopians were not ready and no provision had been made for an additional 1,000 persons in the hotels.⁸⁹

The above describes the effort to improve on a temporary solution. For many Ethiopians, the caravans were an improvement; they lived as families and they cooked for themselves. Ironically the caravans became the next housing problem. Unlike the large showcase site, Nachal Bekka in Beer Sheva, with paved roads, public transportation, social services, pre-school facilities and public telephones, many lacked these amenities. Most were in rural and isolated areas and included a least two army camps; they provided few services and even fewer job opportunities.⁹⁰

Permanent Housing Solutions

The government's overall housing policies toward immigrants in general influenced the permanent housing options for Ethiopian immigrants. In the summer of 1989, the liaison office (*Lishkat Hakesher*) of the Prime Minister's Office informed the Beilin Committee – which was at the time planning for 100,000 immigrants over the next three years – to expect 240,000 in 1990 and almost a million in the next few years! Most participants accepted the report at face value.⁹¹

In late spring 1990, the government acted to increase the low- and moderate-income housing supply for new immigrants. Many, but not all, actions were taken by Ariel Sharon, the housing minister and absorption co-ordinator of the Shamir government after June 1990. Sharon put together a housing programme sufficient to handle the influx of Soviet immigrants. Ideology, weaker municipal authorities and available land influenced his preference for construction in northern and southern peripheral areas to Israel's centre. Efforts included the following:

First, the government considerably increased land available to builders. This involved conversion of agricultural land, a change in allocation procedures (from tenders to direct allocation), reducing the cost and improving finance conditions. The government strengthened Sharon when it transferred to his ministry the Israel Lands Authority which owns almost 90 per cent of all land in Israel.⁹²

Second, the government provided incentives to reduce construction time.⁹³ It also shortened the planning process for 63 emergency sites on which the Housing Ministry would build 15,000 (proposed 57,000) family homes (single units and duplexes). Many were located in development towns both in the periphery and in the outer rim of central Israel.

Third, the government guaranteed to purchase units built for immigrants

(100 per cent in the periphery and 50 per cent elsewhere) which the builders could not sell. The government planned to resell the apartments for less than the purchase price. Up to mid-1992, it bought back 18,840 units for \$1.1 billion (2.7 billion NIS). The *Jerusalem Post* reported on the buy back of about 50,000 units. Almost all of these units would be in the periphery, since housing built in the centre was sold.⁹⁴

Fourth, the government increased construction (via public companies and/or turnkey) of low-income housing, funding 3,000 units in 1989, 8,000 units in 1990, and 12,000 in 1992.

Finally, the government expanded mortgages for Ethiopians to encourage them to purchase apartments in 'strong areas' in central Israel.⁹⁵ Smaller mortgages of \$72,000 (174,000 NIS) were available for other areas. The ministry also provided a preferential mortgage to mixed Ethiopian/non-Ethiopian families.⁹⁶

All of these efforts increased housing starts from 21,950 in 1988 to just over 85,000 in 1991. The major increase came from the government's construction efforts in peripheral areas, especially southern Israel.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, as with previous policies, implementation contradicted stated goals and official policy announcements. The Ministry of Housing argued that the 'socio-economic character of Ethiopian immigrants requires housing solutions mostly in the centre of Israel'.⁹⁸ It officially opposed housing them in weak communities and in the periphery. Yet, in November 1991, the Housing Ministry reported that its proposed 1992 budget did not provide solutions for housing Ethiopians in the centre but in the north and south where most construction was taking place. A year later in November 1992, it noted that some of the 3000 units under construction in the periphery could be allocated for Ethiopians, and a senior government official recommended changing six or more absorption centres (445-plus apartments) to permanent housing for Ethiopians.⁹⁹

The enlarged mortgages also did not make a difference in terms of the location of purchased housing. In practice, the 'generous grants are usually insufficient to buy an apartment in a decent neighbourhood'.¹⁰⁰ While many Ethiopians purchased units in central Israel, their homes were located in the poorer neighbourhoods and often in the same building or street as other Ethiopians (see Appendix).

A JAFI experiment in modified direct absorption of Ethiopians in private apartments directed immigrants to peripheral development towns. Unlike 'direct absorption,' participants were assigned to a particular community and apartment, limited to two-parent families, and received the same benefits and services provided in absorption centres.¹⁰¹ All participants had the option of later receiving a mortgage to purchase elsewhere and most did so.

In conclusion, many permanent apartments provided for, or purchased by, Ethiopians were in peripheral development towns that had high unemployment, fewer economic opportunities, and problematic educational systems.¹⁰² A Ministry of Absorption report stated that the 'housing plan targeted to Ethiopian immigrants was based on their residing together in public housing in peripheral areas of the country.'¹⁰³

Many also went to live in several development towns on the outer edge of the centre of the country between the periphery and metropolitan areas in the 'slipover range of the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area'.¹⁰⁴ Here they were also spatially segregated, often in the poorer neighbourhoods. While these towns might offer fewer opportunities for employment, the residents are within 'commuting distance' of the economically expanding centre of the country. Whether the Ethiopians living there do commute is beyond the scope of this study.

Explanations

Following Operations Moses and Solomon, the Jewish Agency housed tens of thousands of Ethiopian immigrants in absorption centres, hotels, and caravans. It denied those arriving after 1988 participation in 'direct absorption'. Many remained in these facilities for several years. For permanent housing, the government and the Jewish Agency favored dispersed units in established communities in central Israel. This proved to be more myth than reality. Many of the first Ethiopian occupants of permanent housing received older public housing or leased units concentrated in peripheral development towns and in low-income neighbourhoods in central Israel. Others occupied low-income, all-Ethiopian apartment blocks that had once been their absorption centres. Later housing policies, including new construction, leasing of private units, and mortgages, brought additional Ethiopian immigrants to the same buildings, low-income neighbourhoods, and peripheral towns.

Holt argues that 'social and spatial segregation patterns among the Ethiopian Jewish community in housing [in Israel]' was unavoidable given 'the combined social and structural dynamics of immigrant-veteran relations'.¹⁰⁵ While not discounting policies which created dependence, he argues that both veterans and immigrants in initial encounters 'have incentives to shield themselves from the full impact of strategies designed to facilitate social and economic "integration"'.¹⁰⁶ Due to their low educational levels and relative poverty, the immigrants stick together in order to cope better with the host society. They favor clustering and oppose change as does the host society. 'The dynamic is bi-directional; both strong and weak groups reinforce cultural boundaries in their mutual encounters.'¹⁰⁷

The findings here confirm that many Ethiopians chose to live in close proximity to other Ethiopians and that many Israelis rejected them as neighbours. Moreover, from the beginning, Israeli officials were aware of the potential for social and spatial segregation. Yet, evidence here also indicates that the government of Israel provided Ethiopian immigrants with few alternatives and choices to enable them to avoid spatial segregation. Those not wanting to live near relatives or friends in spatially segregated areas lacked realistic opportunities for housing in better neighbourhoods.

Rather than being inevitable, the spatial segregation of Ethiopian Jewish immigrants resulted from policies taken by the Israeli government. While favouring dispersed housing in established communities, the government housed them in weaker towns and poorer neighbourhoods throughout Israel. Although officials did not favour spatial segregation of Ethiopians, a dispersal policy in well-established communities became politically 'unacceptable' to the several governments of Israel and to the Jewish Agency – none were willing to implement such a policy.¹⁰⁸ On the one hand, too few Israeli organizations and political groups favoured and supported a housing dispersal policy. There were in fact no important lobby or individuals fighting for these policies and goals. Clearly absent were Bardach's 'fixer' or Dror's 'crusading' spirit.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, too many Israelis would have opposed a dispersal programme that spread Ethiopians among middle-class and better-off neighbourhoods and communities in central Israel.¹¹⁰ Ethiopians themselves may have opposed such an effort. In addition, there were political and economic incentives to concentrate Ethiopians in spatially segregated neighbourhoods and peripheral development towns.

Following Operation Moses, some mayors and residents in peripheral development towns and poorer communities in the centre opposed the placement of additional Ethiopians in their community. In some cases mayoral opposition was a means of receiving (or extorting) more resources; the Agency and the government often compensated municipalities for accepting Ethiopians. They also developed a municipal quota policy (10 to 15 per cent of the local population) for settling Ethiopians in public housing and for providing mortgages.¹¹¹

While most officials play down the racial discrimination factor, one former senior Absorption Ministry official claims that opposition by Israelis prevented implementation of the policy objective of having no more than three Ethiopian families per building.¹¹²

Economic considerations also influenced permanent housing policies. The cost of dispersed housing in good neighbourhoods in central Israel, via construction, purchase, and/or mortgages, was prohibitive.¹¹³ Until 1984, 'the driving force [of policymaking in Israel] was the vision and the political

will, not the cost of economic calculations and the budget constraints.¹¹⁴ This changed after 1985. Consequently, not all that some might have wanted to do could be done.

In the earlier period, a change in government low-income housing policy towards reliance on subsidized mortgages and rents resulted in the provision of fewer low-income housing options. Many Ethiopians residing in the absorption centres could not afford to rent in the private market.¹¹⁵ This led to the utilization of empty public housing units in development towns in the periphery and in low-income neighbourhoods in central Israel. Another alternative was the conversion of temporary absorption centres into permanent housing.

While the Shamir Government after 1990 reiterated a policy of housing Ethiopian immigrants in scattered sites in communities with strong infrastructures, economic considerations resulted in a their continuing to be concentrated in weaker communities throughout Israel. As one official commented, 'We want to spread them out in strong communities, but the Ministry of Housing is building in the north and south on the basis of cost.'

Dror argues that most public policymaking follows the line of least resistance and limits the search for alternatives; 'creativity, imagination and innovation in planning are generally rare, and are called upon only by some new challenge, such as a ... crisis.'¹¹⁶ While the shock of the Soviet immigration encouraged innovation, the Ethiopians apparently did not constitute a crisis situation! Consequently, the government and Agency responded with paternalistic routines for absorbing weak immigrant groups.¹¹⁷

Israeli decision-makers viewed the seriousness and complexity of absorbing Ethiopian Jews in such a way as to require minimum coping and maximum use of past routines.¹¹⁸ This meant traditional absorption centres and public housing. When innovation occurred, it often meant removing the issue from the public agenda rather than solving a problem. The conversion of temporary absorption centres to permanent housing is a case in point.¹¹⁹ Rather than solving the problem in the long-run, however, it provided a solution that ensured racial segregation and isolation and enhanced Israeli objections to accepting Ethiopians as neighbours.

The different responses of the government and the Agency to Ethiopian and Russian immigrants reflected political reality. The Soviet immigration numbered ten to 15 times that of Ethiopians and some experts expected more to come. The size of the Soviet immigration offered Israel tremendous promise along with the potential for economic and even social disaster. Their numbers also gave Soviet immigrants political influence as voters. They could not be neglected or treated in the same paternalistic way as the Ethiopians – their dissatisfaction with the Shamir government contributed

to its loss in the 1992 Knesset elections. Moreover, many potential Soviet immigrants had alternatives; all could remain in the former Soviet Union and many could emigrate to the United States and other Western countries. The burden of increased immigration of Soviet Jews to the United States led several American Jewish leaders to pressure Israel and the Jewish Agency to do more for Soviet Jews in order to insure their choosing Israel. In contrast, the AAEJ lacked the political clout in Israel of the established American Jewish community.

The acceptance of certain political and economic realities limited the ability of policymakers to implement policies designed to disperse Ethiopian immigrants. Writing in 1986, Dror believed that Israel and Zionism had the 'potential to transform realities through revolutionary policymaking'.¹²⁰ This does not seem to be the case with respect to the provision of housing for Ethiopians.

APPENDIX 1 IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL

Year	Total	USSR	Ethiopian	Year	Total	USSR	Ethiopian
1948*	101,828			1972	55,888	31,652	
1949	239,954			1973	54,866	33,477	
1950	170,563			1974	31,981		
1951	175,279			1975	20,028		
1952	24,610			1976	19,754		91**
1953	11,575			1977	21,429	8,348	125
1954	18,491			1978	26,394	12,192	3
1955	37,528			1979	37,222	17,614	30
1956	56,330			1980	20,428	7,570	258
1957	72,634			1981	12,599	1,770	601
1958	27,290			1982	13,723	782	528
1959	23,988			1983	16,906	399	2,192
1960	24,692			1984	19,981	367	8,240
1961	47,735			1985	10,642	348	1,763
1962	61,533			1986	9,505	201	209
1963	64,489			1987	12,965	2,072	252
1964	55,036			1988	13,034	2,173	603
1965	31,115			1989	24,050	12,800	1,382
1966	15,957			1990	199,516	185,200	4,153
1967	14,469			1991	176,096	147,800	20,026
1968	20,703			1992	77,032	65,100	3,538
1969	38,111			1993	77,000	66,100	700
1970	36,750			1994	80,000	68,100	
1971	41,930	12,819					

Sources: Baruch Gur-Gurevitz, *Open Gates* (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency, 1996), p.27; JAFI Communications Division, 'Operation Exodus, Background Information', 19 August 1990; Kaplan and Rosen, p. 70; Memo, Arnon Mantver to Uri Gordon, 2 February 1992; Sharkansky, p. 72.

*15 May–31 December 1948

**1972–1976

APPENDIX 2
AMIGOUR PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS OCCUPIED BY ETHIOPIAN JEWS
(as of September 1997)

Location	Regular Units		NER Units		Total
	apartments	persons	apartments	persons	persons
Ashdod A	150	427	43	204	631
Ashdod B	122	436	74	300	736
Ashkelon	271	858	11	56	914
Carmiel	81	378		378	
Jerusalem	76	100		100	
Kiryat Ata	72	124	3	19	143
Kiryat Yam	218	497	104	341	838
Migdal Emek	125	483	2	13	496
Nahariya	7	27		27	
Netivot	138	705		705	
Ofakim	182	615	1	2	617
Sderot	69	321		321	
Tel Aviv Area	205	250		250	
Total	1,716*	5,251	238**	935	6,156***

Source: Memo from Amigour to Fred Lazin, 10 September 1997.

* Another 37 apartments were bought by Ethiopian tenants.

** Another 4 apartments were bought by Ethiopian tenants.

*** Total number of Ethiopian residents in Amigour is between 6,156 and 6,186.

Note: Regular units are located in Amigour owned and/or operated buildings. NER apartments are units that the government purchased in the private market and Amigour manages.

The following describes some of the units in the above municipalities: In **Jerusalem**, 48 of the units are in a single hostel in Kiryat Gat and 28 are in a single hostel in Jerusalem; in **Ashkelon** many of the units are spread out in the Shimshon neighborhood; in **Netivot**, new construction, spread out; in **Migdal Emek**, **Carmiel**, and **Nahariya** most units are spread out; in **Ofakim**, 136 units spread out in town and 46 in a single hostel in Beer-Sheva; in **Kiryat Ata**, 42 units in a hotel in town and 30 in a hostel in Kiryat Bialik; in **Kiryat Yam**, 28 units in a hostel in Nesher; 23 in a second hostel; 45 in a Kiryat Mozkin hostel; and 132 in a Kiryat Yam hostel; in **Tel Aviv**, 71 units in a Netanya hostel; 14 in a Ramat Gan hostel; 30 in a Bat Yam hostel; and 46 in a Holon Hostel, 35 in a Kfar Saba hostel and 6 in a Lod hostel.

APPENDIX 3
AMIDAR PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS OCCUPIED BY ETHIOPIAN JEWS
(as of September 1997)

Location	Regular Units		NER Units		Total
	apartments	persons	apartments	persons	persons*
Afula	233	1,168			1,168
Arad	25	102	2	14	116
Bat Yam	4	7	86	389	396
Beer Sheva	305	1,368	29	120	1,488
Eilat	11	43			43
Hadera	23	30	88	352	382
Herzliya	9	13	12	57	70
Hod Hasharon	4	7	11	51	58
Holon	1	4	16	92	96
Kfar Saba	5	12	13	56	68
Kiryat Gata	122	401	23	106	506
Kiryat Malachi	12	88	11	60	148
Lod	3	9	38	167	176
Nazereth (upper)	73	226			226
Nes Ziyona			15	69	69
Nesher	24	125			125
Netanya	20	70	267	1,123	1,193
Pardes Hana Kirkur	39	113	6	12	125
Petach Tikva	7	14	74	327	341
Raanana	1	4	4	12	16
Ramle	6	14	113	442	456
Rehovot			95	325	325
Rishon Lezion	2	3	101	585	588
Yahud			19	89	89
Yavne	3	6	64	314	320
Yokneam (upper)	18	82			82
Other places	25	51	22	81	132
Total	975	3,960	1,109	4,853	8,803

Source: Memos, Amidar to Fred Lazin, 30 September 1997.

* In addition, 6,017 Ethiopian immigrants (1,733 families (or 1,785 heads of families) resided in caravans or *meguranim*.

APPENDIX 4
SUMMARY: LOCATION OF MUNICIPALITY, NUMBER OF ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS, NUMBER OF ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING (AMIDAR AND AMIGOUR), NUMBER OF MORTGAGES ISSUED TO ETHIOPIANS WHO PURCHASED HOUSING IN MUNICIPALITY, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RANKING OF MUNICIPALITY

Municipality	Location*	Ethiopian Population**			Public housing units***	Mortgages issued		Socio-economic rank***		
		wave a	wave b	total		to 31.12.92	from 1.1.93	total	1992	1995
Afula	P DT	2100	1150	3250	1168	69	18	87	4	4
Arad	P DT	250	190	440	116				4	5
Ashdod	S DT	2200	2200	4400	1367	177	344	521	4	4
Ashkelon	S DT	1500	2200	3700	914	232	191	423	3	3
Bat Yam	C	600	170	770	396	12	53	65	6	6
Beer-Sheva	P	2700	1600	4300	1488	104	104	208	3	4
Beer Yakov	C		180	180		1	34	35	5	5
Beit Shan	P DT	200	100	300		43	1	44	1	4
Beit Shemesh	S DT		250	250		25	32	57	3	4
Bnai Brak	C	150	16	310					5	4
Carmiel	P DT	700	250	950	378	77	11	88	5	5
Eilat	P DT		75	75	43	45	1	46	5	7
Gedera	S	635		635		5	123	128	5	5
Gan Yavne	S		340	340			46	46	5	6
Herzliya	C	100	70	170	70	13	15	28	7	8
Hadera	C	1000	3200	4200	382	87	557	644	5	5
Haifa	C	300	150	450		9	80	89	7	7
Hod Hasharon	C	50	145	195	58				7	7
Holon	C	600	100	700	96	14	36	50	7	7
Jerusalem	C	200	290	490	100	89	59	148	6	6
Kfar Saba	C		330	330	68	16	555	71	7	7
Kiryat Ata	S DT	300	100	400	143	31	36	67	4	4
Kiryat Bialik	C	100	400	500		13	60	73	7	7
Kiryat Ekron	C	50	650	700		13	82	95	2	4
Kiryat Gat	S DT	1700	600	2300	506	131	52	183	3	2

Municipality	Location*	Ethiopian Population**			Public housing units***	Mortgages issued		Socio-economic rank***		
		wave a	wave b	total		to 31.12.92	from 1.1.93	total	1992	1995
Kiryat Malachi	S DT	500	2000	2500	148	40	285	325	4	2
Kiryat Motzkin	C	250	350	600		21	100	121	7	7
Kiryat Yam	C	800	270	1070	838	49	126	175	5	4
Lod	C	600	500	1100	176	37	151	188	3	4
Maaleh Adumin	S		100	100		8	25	33	6	7
Migdal Emek	S DT	800	300	1100	496	24	29	54	1	3
Mevasert Tziona	C		80	80					7	8
Mizkeret Batya	S		250	250		2	24	26	5	7
Nazereth (upper)	P DT	1000	150	1150	226	22	16	38	4	4
Nes Ziyona	C	100	350	450	69	3	47	50	6	7
Nahariya	S DT	130	20	150	27	24	3	27	5	5
Nesher	S		120	120	125				5	5
Netanya	C	1600	2250	3850	1123	170	511	681	5	5
Netivot	P DT	300	1050	1350	705	30	25	55	2	2
Ofakim	P DT	250	530	780	617				2	1
Pardes Hana-Kirkur	C	300	1250	1550	125	9	161	170	4	6
Petach Tikva	C	800	900	1700	341	79	101	180	6	7
Ramle	C	800	2600	3400	456	81	326	407	3	4
Raanana	C	100	50	150	12				8	8
Rehovot	C	400	2800	3200	325	42	665	707	6	7
Rishon LeZion	C	400	600	1000	588	112	129	241	7	7
Rosh Ayin	C		250	250		22	47	69	4	6
Safed	P DT		70	70		32	10	42	3	4
Sderot	P DT	300	325	528	321				2	1
Tiberias	P DT		120	120		37	5	42	2	4
Tirat HaCarmel	C	50	160	210		15	23	38	2	2
Yahud	C		130	130	89				5	5
Yavne	C	300	1750	2050	320	63	226	289	5	6
Yokneam (upper)	S DT		330	330	82	6	2	38	3	3

For key and sources, see p.62.

Key to Appendix 4:

* **Location:** C central Israel; DT development town; P periphery; S Seam (edge of central Israel)

** **Ethiopian population** (with at least 50 persons in municipality) as of 13 March 1997. Calculated by Ministry of Absorption. Wave a is from Operation Moses up to Operation Solomon. Wave b is from Operation Solomon to March 1997. Figures do not include 2,200 Ethiopian immigrants in rural caravan sites and 800 in absorption centres.

*** **Public housing** includes Amidar and Amigour regular and NER units.

**** The Ministry of Interior has ranked the 188 municipalities (Jewish, Arab, Druze) according to their socio-economic characteristics. They did factor analysis of seven variables, including residents' financial sources, housing, home equipment, level of motorization, schooling and education, traits of employment and unemployment, and different types of socio-economic distress. They numbered each community on a scale and clustered them into 8 groups on a continuum, with poverty at the lower end and wealth at the other end. Groupings 1–5 are considered low, 5–8 middle, and 9–10 highest.

Sources: State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Characterization and Ranking of Local Authorities according to the Population's Socio-Economic Level in 1995* (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997); Memo and printout, Michaela Gerzon (Ministry of Housing) to Fred Lazin, 4 May 1997; State of Israel, Ministry of Absorption, 'Spread of Ethiopian Immigrants by Municipality', 13 March 1997; Memo, Amigour to Fred Lazin, 10 September 1997; Memo and printout, Amidar to Fred Lazin, 30 September 1997.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewer and Ms Catherine T. Logan for their comments and suggestions.

NOTES

1. Chaim Fialkoff, 'Israel's Housing Policy in Flux: Review Assessment and Prognosis', *Housing for a World in Need* (Haifa: Technion, 1993).
2. Jonathan Lipow, 'Israel's Housing Subsidy Programs' (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Research Papers in Land Economics, 1996), p.2; Y. Aharoni, *The Israeli Economy: Dreams and Realities* (London: Routledge, 1991), p.229.
3. Minutes of Meeting between Jewish Agency and the Government in the Office of Prime Minister, June 1987; Gabriel Lipshitz, 'Absorption of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel 1990–1995: The Housing and Employment Dimensions of Regional Development', paper presented at Metropolis Conference, Milan (1996), pp.4–8). Copies of most documents cited here are located in the offices of the Secretary General of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. Documents relating to the Beilin Committee are in the Ministry of Finance.
4. Alex Weingrod, 'Patterns of Adaptation of Ethiopian Jews within Israeli Society', in Steven Kaplan, Tudor Parfitt and Emanuela Trevisan Semi (eds), *Between Africa and Zion: Proceedings of the First international Congress of the Society for the Study of Ethiopian Jewry* (Jerusalem: JDC and Ben-Zvi Institute, 1995), pp.294ff, 252; Ira Sharkansky, *Policy Making in Israel: Routines and Coping for Simple and Complex Problems*. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), p.75.
5. State of Israel, Ministry of Absorption, 'The Absorption of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: The Present Situation and Future Objectives' (Jerusalem: Ministry of Absorption, 1996), p.1.
6. David Holt, 'The Culture Cluster: A Comparative Perspective on Ethiopian Jewish Problems in Israel', *Israel Social Science Review* Vol.10, No.2 (1995), pp.97–116.

7. Steven Kaplan and Haim Rosen, 'Ethiopian Jews in Israel', in David Singer (ed.), *The American Jewish Yearbook 1994* (New York: AJC, 1994), pp.59-109.
8. Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1974) pp.260-71; Yehezkel Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), p.35.
9. Yehezkel Dror, *Policymaking Under Adversity* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986), p.49.
10. Michael Kirst and Richard Jung, 'The Utility of a Longitudinal Approach in Assessing Implementation: A Thirteen-Year View of Title I, ESEA,' in Walter Williams *et al.* (eds), *Studying Implementation: Methodological and Administrative Issues* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Press, 1982), pp.119-48; Jerome T. Murphey, 'The Education Bureaucracies Implement Novel Policy: The Politics of Title I of the ESEA, 1965-1972', in Allan P.Sindler (ed.), *Policy and Politics in America* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1973), pp.161-89.
11. Robert Yin, 'Studying the Implementation of Public Programs', in Williams, p.63.
12. Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Harold Lasswell, *The Decision Process* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Bureau of Governmental Research, 1956); Harold Lasswell, 'The Decision process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis', in Polsby, Dentler and Smith (eds), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963); R. T. Nakamura and F. Smallwood, *The Politics of Policy Implementation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); Paul Sabatier, 'Political Science and Public Policy', *PS* (June 1991), pp.144-7.
13. Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, p.14.
14. Paul Berman, 'Thinking About Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: Matching Strategies to Situations,' in Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann (eds), *Why Policies Succeed or Fail* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), pp.205-27.
15. Aharoni, p.242.
16. Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror, *Israel: High-Pressure Planning* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp.8-10.
17. Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*; Sharkansky; and Aharoni,.
18. Akzin and Dror, pp.7-10.
19. Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, p.95.
20. Sharkansky, p.64.
21. Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, p.14.
22. Established in 1929, the Jewish Agency represented world Jewry and the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in efforts to establish a Jewish State (Ernest Stock, *Chosen Instrument: The Jewish Agency in the First Decade of the State of Israel* (New York: Herzl Press, 1988), pp.7ff). The Israeli government delegated to the Agency primary responsibility for the initial care of new immigrants in 1952 (Law of Status) and 1954 (Covenant). Although partially controlled by the government's coalition parties, the Agency can act independently. It receives its funds from the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) in the United States and the Keren Hayesod elsewhere. In the late 1980s, the Agency officially declared its intention to transfer its absorption functions and facilities to the government (Israel Katz, Arye Globerson, Yaakov Kop, Joseph Neipris, and Jimmy Weinblatt, *The Jewish Agency Department of Immigration and Absorption: Options For Change* (Jerusalem: The Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, 1987).
23. State of Israel, Office of the State Comptroller. *Report 40* (Jerusalem: Office of the State Comptroller, 1989), p.534.
24. S. Barrett and C. Fudge (eds), *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy* (London and New York: Methuen, 1981), p.270.
25. Jewish Agency for Israel, Department of Youth Aliya, *Absorption of Young Olim from Ethiopia in Youth Aliya: 1985-1995* (Jerusalem: JAFI, 1995), p.22; Tamar Horowitz, 'Value-Oriented Parameters in Migration Policies in the 1990s: The Israeli Experience', *International Migration Quarterly Review*, Vol.34, No.4 (1996), pp.513-36.

26. As citizens, they have the right to vote in all elections. Shmuel Adler, 'Israel's Absorption Politics since the 1970s', in N. Lewin-Epstein, Y. Ro'i and P. Ritterband (eds), *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.135–44 [early version]; Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1985), p.18.
27. Aharoni, p.216, refers to 110,000 and Stock, *Chosen Instrument*, pp.78–89 to 160,000. Also see Stock, pp.96–99.
28. Since 1951 the government has issued national plans for population dispersal. It issued number 31 in 1992. Paul Rivlin, 'Planning, Housing Policies and Immigration in the 1990s' (Jerusalem: Institute For Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Policy Studies Research Papers in Land Economics, 1993), pp.4–6. Also see Aharoni, p.116; Erik Cohen, *The City in Zionist Ideology* (Jerusalem: Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970); S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p.198; Zvi Gitelman and David Naveh, 'Elite Accommodation and Organizational Effectiveness: The Case of Immigrant Absorption in Israel', *Journal of Politics*, Vol.38, No.4 (1976), p.569; Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp.90ff.; Stock, *Chosen Instrument*, pp.162–84.
29. Efraim Torgovnik, *The Politics of Urban Planning* (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1990), p.26; Rivlin, 1993, p.4.
30. Gabriel Sheffer, 'Elite Cartel, Vertical Domination, and Grassroots Discontent in Israel', in Sidney Tarrow, Peter Katzenstein and Luigi Graziano (eds), *Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations* (NY: Praeger, 1978), pp.64–96; Aharoni, pp.229ff.
31. Sharkansky, p.7; Aharoni.
32. Chaim Adler, Reuven Kahane, and Amy Avgar, *The Education of the Disadvantaged in Israel: Comparisons, Analysis and Proposed Research* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Education, 1975); Lipshitz, pp.1–2; Avram Shama and Mark Iris, *Immigration without Integration: Third World Jews in Israel* (Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, 1977); Ernest Stock, *Beyond Partnership: The Jewish Agency and the Diaspora 1959–1971* (New York: Herzl Press, 1992), pp.104ff.
33. Jeff Halper, 'The Absorption of Ethiopian Immigrants: A Return to the Fifties', *Israel Social Science Research*, Vol.3, Nos.1–2 (1985), pp.112–39; Smooha.
34. Michael Ashkenazi, 'Studying the Students: Information Exchange, Ethiopian Immigrants, Social Workers, and Visitors', *Israel Social Science Research*, Vol.3 Nos.1–2 (1985), p.90; Alex Weingrod, *Reluctant Pioneers: Village Development in Israel* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p.122; Eisenstadt, p.199; Halper, p.122.
35. Weingrod, *Reluctant Pioneers*, pp.vii, 121.
36. Stock, *Chosen Instrument*, pp.128–9, 243.
37. Ibid., 1992.
38. S. Adler, p.136; Horowitz, p.536.
39. Michael Ashkenazi and Alex Weingrod (eds), *Ethiopian Jews and Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987).
40. They could rent the apartments for up to three years. At all times, about 1,000 apartments remained vacant. S. Adler, p.138.
41. Minutes of JAFI and Government in the Office of Prime Minister, June 1987.
42. Nevertheless, several hundred families and individuals, if not more, managed on their own. They moved in with relatives and friends upon their arrival or from absorption centres. Might other options along these lines have been developed, especially during the early 1990s, with tens of thousands of veteran Ethiopians in Israel? See Weingrod, 'Patterns of Adaptation', p.253ff.
43. Esther Hertzog, 'The Bureaucratic Absorption of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: Integration or Segregation?' in Kaplan, Parfitt and Trevisan Semi, p.197; Stock, *Chosen Instrument*, p.200. Some senior Agency officials believed that it would be difficult to handle immigration (bringing Jews to Israel) without control of initial absorption.
44. 'Cash Flow' in *Jerusalem Report*, 9 April 1992.
45. Tad Szulc, *The Secret Alliance: The Extraordinary Story of the Rescue of Jews since World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991), p.292.

46. Graenum Berger, *Graenum: An Autobiography* (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1987) and *Rescue the Ethiopian Jews! A Memoir, 1955–1995* (New York: John Washburn Bleeker Hampton Publishing, 1996). Following independence, a few politicians favoured restricting Jewish immigration; some objected to taking in too many, too soon and others wanted to limit 'hard core' cases. Policies of 'selection' existed in the 1950s, but were not applied to European Jews and were waived when lives were threatened (Deborah Bernstein, 'Immigrants and Society – A Critical View of the Dominant School of Israeli Sociology', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.31, No.2 (1980), p.259; Stock, *Chosen Instrument*, pp.3ff, 45ff, 249ff.
47. Kaplan and Rosen, pp.62ff.
48. Memo of Secretary General of JAFI to members of the government, JAFI Coordination Committee (CC), 24 October 1984.
49. The question of the legitimacy of their Jewish identity remained an issue even after their arrival in Israel. Some groups, including the Chabad Movement, would not let them into their schools without undergoing formal conversion (Youth Aliya, 1995, p.29). In response to protests and pressure by Ethiopian activists, the Orthodox establishment has shown a degree of pragmatism toward the community (see Kaplan and Rosen, pp.74ff.).
50. Szulc, pp.294ff: Kaplan and Rosen, pp.59ff.
51. *New York Times* (2 November 1990) estimated 12,000, the Jewish Agency 10,000 (Barbara Promislow 'Updated Background on the Jews of Ethiopia', 23 May 1991); Kaplan and Rosen, pp.63, 74ff, estimated 6,700. Also see Szulc, p.298.
52. Minutes of meeting between representatives of JAFI and Prime Minister, June 22, 1987.
53. Memo, Arnon Mantver to Uri Gordon, 2 February 1992; and Protocol of CC of 17 February 1991. See also Appendix.
54. Kaplan and Rosen, p.65; Szulc, p.300; Memo, Arnon Mantver to Simcha Dinitz, 7 May 1991.
55. Summary, Director Generals of JAFI (DG-JAFI), 16 July 1990 and 3 September 1990; Kaplan and Rosen, pp.65ff. Almaya, a Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) organization, provided shelter and food and established a school with 4,500 pupils. UJA funds the JDC. Almaya employed almost two thousand persons and had an annual budget of \$7 million! (Szulc, 1991, p.300; DG-JAFI, 3 September 1990). Both the director of Almaya and the JAFI in Addis were consuls in the Israeli embassy. The JAFI became a partner in the refugee camp and, in the spring of 1991, began processing residents for evacuation and later absorption in Israel. Eligibility was usually based on a 1976 census conducted by Gershon Levy of ORT in Ethiopia (with JDC funds) and later updated by HIAS Director in Israel Chaim Halachmi using interviews with participants of Operation Moses (Szulc, p.301).
56. DG-JAFI, 28 April 1991; 'Imperiled in Ethiopia', *Jerusalem Post*, 18 March 1991.
57. Letter, Chaim Zohar, 3 October 1984; Stock, *Beyond Partnership*, p.7; CC of 24 June and 29 October 1984.
58. Memo, Secretary General of the JAFI to CC, 24 October 1984.
59. Ministry of Absorption, 'The Ethiopian Immigrants: Report of their situation and an operative plan to establish their absorption in February 1987', 9 February 1987.
60. Memo, Sec. Gen. to the CC, 24 October 1984; Kaplan and Rosen, pp.82ff.; Hertzog, pp.189–202; Weingrod, 'Patterns of Adaptation'.
61. Social Services Division of Absorption Department, JAFI, 'Annual Report on Immigration from Ethiopia,' 13 February 1984; CC of 24 June 1985; Committee on Immigrant Absorption (NY) JAFI, 17 February 1986; Kaplan and Rosen, pp.82ff.
62. Memo, Moshe Nativ to Mendel Kaplan, 7 June 1989.
63. Letter, Yisrael Schwartz to regional ministry directors, 25 June 1991.
64. In response to the projected influx of Ethiopians in 1991, the government and the JAFI planned for ten additional absorption centres, which included use of two army bases and vacation facilities of the Soldiers Benevolence Association. Protocol of CC of 17 February 1991 and Summary DG-JAFI, 10 December 1990; Cabinet decisions of 16 December 1990.
65. 'Operation of absorption centers', 6 March 1991 and 19 February 1991, Ministry of

Absorption meeting on absorption of Ethiopians.

66. Minutes, JAFI Housing Committee, 23 October 1987 and 27 October 1987. Amidar, a government company and Amigour, owned by the Jewish Agency, own and manage low-income public housing (Aharoni, pp.216ff).
67. Amigour report, 23 June 1988. A draft of the Beilin Committee's plan referred to the rehabilitation of 520 public housing units at a cost of \$10,000 per unit (Letter, Moshe Nativ to Max Fisher, 26 July 1989).
68. JAFI Immigration Subcommittee, 17–18 October 1985, and Housing Committee of JAFI, 18 February 1985; Memo, Mendel Kaplan to Moshe Nativ, 12 February 1990; and Memo, Yisrael Schwartz to Habib Katzav, 10 February 1991.
69. The units are called 'NER' in Hebrew, an acronym for *Neches Nirkash* [purchased assets]. The FY 1989 budget allocated 13.4 million NIS for NER units for low-income categories (Comptroller's Report 40, p.535).
70. Letter, Yossi Kutchik to David Levene, 8 November 1988. One housing official at the time stated that the placement of Ethiopians in these units would make it harder to sell other units in the same complex. (Subcommittee on Ethiopians in Ministry of Absorption, 24 April 1991).
71. Amidar and Amigour managed these units. Memo, B. Manzuri to Rav Yitzhak Aaron, 4 September 1986, and *Jerusalem Post*, 18 September 1987. Two hotels in the north became permanent absorption centres (JAFI Comptroller Office, 'Summary of findings', 13 April 1992).
72. Memo, Yisrael Schwartz to Fred Lazin, 21 July 1996, 'Mortgages for Ethiopians 1988–'. The total for 1988–96 was 6,173.
73. Kaplan and Rosen, pp.84ff.
74. When the maximum mortgage level was at \$32,000 for a family of four, Dr. Chaim Fialkoff ('Israel's Privatized Housing Policy During an Era of Massive Immigration', in A. Shachar, D. Morley, and A. Kruger, *Public Services Under Stress* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1993), p.81) favored raising it to \$64,000. He estimated that the provision of expanded mortgages to 30,000 families would cost the government \$2.1 billion. Ethiopian families received larger mortgages than Russian and other immigrants.
75. Memo, Yisrael Schwartz to Aryeh Barr, 30 May 1991.
76. Letter, Simcha Dinitz to Yitzhak Modai, 21 May 1992; Memo, Yisrael Schwartz to Aryeh Barr, 30 May 1991; see Appendix.
77. Summary meeting of Ethiopian team of 1 May 1991.
78. Many were divided into two- and three- room units with bathroom and kitchenette. Units for two families were called *Meguranim*, and they were designed for small families and couples without children.
79. Letter, Arnon Mantver to Simcha Dinitz, 7 May 1991.
80. The estimated cost of maintaining a person for one year in a hotel was \$13,500 versus less than \$10,000 for a family of four in an absorption centre! Subcommittee on Absorption, 31 May 1991; Kaplan and Rosen, pp.82ff; Ethiopian forum of JAFI, 19 June 1991; Letter, Arnon Mantver to Simcha Dinitz, 27 August 1991.
81. Circular, DG-JAFI no.5, 17 June 1991; Arnon Mantver to Ediso Masala, 29 May 1991.
82. The Ministry provided annual grants to families taking in single persons (50 years and older) who were related – \$2,500 (6,000 NIS) – and couples – \$3,200 (7,500 NIS). Summary of meeting of Ethiopian Team of the Agency, 5 June 1991; note of Aryeh Barr to Ariel Sharon, 16 June 1991.
83. Some poor Israelis had lost their low-income rental units in the private market to Soviet immigrants able to pay a year's rent in advance as part of direct absorption. In August 1990, the government approved the purchase of 5,000 caravans (each 45 square metres) and in December 1990, the Knesset Finance Committee approved the purchase of 33,000 *Meguranim*. They later reduced this to 22,000 and then to 20,000 units (Comptroller's Report 42, pp.164, 227ff).
84. Comptroller's Reports 41, p.548 and 42, pp.228–30. Of the 26,000 caravans and *Meguranim* in place at the end of 1992 (Comptroller's Report 43, pp.615–8) 20,000 were occupied with 50,000 persons. Rivlin, 1993, pp.13ff, claims that only half of the

caravans/*Meguranim* were occupied.

85. Comptroller's Report 42, pp.228ff.
86. *Ibid.*, pp.233-9 and 43, pp.615-8.
87. Ministry of Housing 'Housing Solutions for Ethiopians... ', 3 November 1991; Interoffice Committee on Ethiopians of 9 March 1992; Memos, Arnon Mantver to Simcha Dinitz, 27 August 1991, and Arnon Mantver to Aryeh Barr, 21 October 1991; Y. Adler to Arnon Mantver, 23 October 1991.
88. Removal Team of 9 December 1991; Letter, Arnon Mantver to Uri Gordon, 2 February 1992; and Memo, Ora Donyo to Tova Pinto, 23 January 1992.
89. According to the Ministry of Absorption, as of September 1992, 3720 Ethiopian families and 1200 singles were still living in caravan sites, 1,460 families and 500 singles in absorption centres, and 157 families in hotels. Interoffice Committee on Ethiopians of 27 May 1992; Memo, JAFI '...caravan timetable', 18 January 1992; JAFI absorption team no.19 of 22 January 1992; Ministry of Absorption, 1996, p.2.
90. Ministry of Housing, *Agaf Iclus* (tenant assignment division) report on ... housing solutions for Ethiopian immigrants, 15 January 1992. The Agency's responsibility for immigrants of Operation Solomon was to end on or about 1 June 1992. Ostensibly, it intended to transfer care to the Absorption and Labour and Social Welfare Ministries and local government authorities. In February 1992, the Agency extended its involvement in caravan sites until 30 August 1992. The government balked at paying for the extension. Letter, Simcha Dinitz to Yitzhak Modai, 21 May 1992; 22 January 1992 Absorption team no.19 of 20 January 1992; Letter, Moshe Nativ to Mendel Kaplan, 29 January 1992; Memo, Moshe Nativ, 5 February 1992; Letters, Simcha Dinitz to Yitzhak Modai, 28 May 1992; Uri Gordon to Yitzhak Peretz, 22 June 1992; and Zvi Barak to Amnon Safran, 16 August 1992. The JAFI was still providing services to 11,730 Ethiopian immigrants in hotels and absorption centres in November 1992, even though it had transferred to the government 16 sites with 12,400 Ethiopians.
91. Comptroller's Report 42, p.242.
92. Comptrollers Report 41, pp.539, 542; Rivlin, pp.8, 9-12ff.
93. While succeeding, the policy increased costs and in some cases finished apartments lacked completed infrastructure. Some builders received the bonus without reducing construction time! (Fialkoff, 'Israel's Privatized Housing Policy During an Era of Massive Immigration'; Rivlin, p.13; Comptroller's Reports 41, p.547 and 42, pp.247-8; Lipshitz, pp.14ff.)
94. Comptroller's Reports 42, pp.164, 242ff; 41, pp.551ff; 43, p.101; Rivlin, 1993 and *Jerusalem Post*, 29 September 1993.
95. A proposal for 500 mortgages involved a 70 per cent grant (\$58,000 or 140,000 NIS) and a 30 per cent loan for a total of \$89,000 or 214,000 NIS (Memo, Aryeh Barr to Ariel Sharon, 16 June 1991).
96. In April 1993 the new Rabin government offered expanded mortgages of up to \$122,000 covering 85 per cent of cost of an apartment; 85 per cent of the mortgage was a grant. It also mounted an intensive information programme to reduce Ethiopian immigrant suspicions of mortgages and home purchases (Kaplan and Rosen, pp.84ff.); Memo, Uzi Gdor to Yisrael Schwartz, 29 May 1991.
97. Fialkoff, 'Israel's Privatized Housing Policy'; Rivlin, p.3; Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988-91 Monthly Bulletin of Statistics XLIII, No.10 (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, October 1992), p.106; Comptroller's Report 42, p.245; Lipshitz, pp.11-12.
98. Memo, Aryeh Barr to Ariel Sharon, 16 June 1991.
99. Memo, Yisrael Schwartz to Aryeh Barr, 20 May 1991; 'Housing Solutions for Ethiopian Immigrants', Iclus Division, 3 November 1991; Second meeting of Inter-Office Committee on Ethiopians, 24 November 1992.
100. Yossi Klein Halevi, 'Lost Tribe', *Jerusalem Report* (30 May 1996), p.17.
101. Memo, Ora Donyo, 25 December 1991; Summary, JAFI team on Ethiopians, 5 June 1991. The JAFI brought the first immigrants from the airport to Ofakim in the Negev in late fall 1991 (25 December 1991, Ora Donyo to Ethiopian Division). By early spring 1992 almost 60 Ethiopian families had settled in Ofakim (Memo, R. Tsafiri to M. Almoslino; JAFI

- document on transfer from hotels to caravans, 13 February 1992). Later units were added in Dimona, Yerucham and Arad (Memo, Ora Donyo to Moshe Almoslino, 8 March 1992; Absorption Team nos.25, 9 March 1992, and 26, 18 March 1992). One source claims that some residents of the caravan site in Beer Sheva were forced to move to Ofakim. Ofakim and Yerucham are very poor communities with serious social and economic problems and very weak educational systems. Dimona shares many of these characteristics, but is larger and more successful, while Arad is an exceptional development town with excellent social and educational services and a high socio-economic profile (see Appendix).
102. This reflected the overall construction picture in which 37 per cent of all starts in 1989 were in the periphery. The figure was 48 per cent in 1990, and 64 per cent in 1991 (*Characteristics and Ranking*, 1997, and Appendix).
 103. Rivlin, 1993; Adler 1996, pp.142ff & Ministry of Absorption, 1996, p.3.
 104. Lipshitz, pp.11ff.
 105. Holt, pp. 97, 102.
 106. Ibid., p.102.
 107. Ibid., p.103. Kaplan and Rosen (p.86) support this position when they conclude that 'the primary factor influencing Ethiopians' choice of housing has been their decision to live near close relatives'.
 108. Banfield, pp. 260ff and Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, pp.35ff.
 109. Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game: What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977); Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, p.83.
 110. As seen in the final table in the Appendix, very few Ethiopians settled in well-to-do municipalities (clusters 8-10).
 111. Some claim it was not strictly enforced. In Kiryat Gat for example, Ethiopian residents of absorption centres protested their inability to obtain mortgages to purchase in the city. After several years they were allowed to do so. A similar situation occurred in Ashkelon. Summary of meeting of subcommittee, Ministry of Absorption, 24 April 1991; JAFI document, 23 June 1988.
 112. The Agency urged the Absorption Ministry to educate the public for absorption of Ethiopians. Memo from Barbara Schipper to Neale Katz, February 1988.
 113. In general, housing for Ethiopians was expensive; the caravans, rehabilitation of public housing, construction incentives, buy-backs, and large mortgages cost a lot of money.
 114. Aharoni, p.332.
 115. Fialkoff, 'Israel's Housing Policy in Flux'; 'Survey of the Olim (immigrants)', 1984; Letter, Chaim Aron to Isador Magid, 7 August 1984.
 116. Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, pp.87ff.
 117. Dror, *Policymaking Under Adversity*, pp.156ff. Sharkansky (p.75) 'links policy issues with styles of policy making. Routines prevail in dealing with simple problems, while coping prevails in dealing with difficult problems' (p.vii). He implies that immigration absorption is a relatively simple problem, since it evokes a policy response composed more of routine and administration than coping, which involves 'compromise, negotiation, and goal redefinition' (p.17). While waves of immigration create stress for Israel policymaking, 'their repetitive nature produced routines that policymakers called on when faced with a new wave' (pp.36-7).
 118. Sharkansky argues that 'the nature of a policy problem influences the politics of policy making' (p.14). By this he means that the policymakers' perception of the problem determined their response! (p.30)
 119. Ibid., pp.23-5.
 120. Dror, *Policymaking Under Adversity*, p.86.